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The inquiry into Ashley Smith’s in-custody death is playing a crucial role in opening up the 
typically inscrutable prison system and forcing the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) to 
defend its policies and practices under intense public scrutiny. Yet there is a risk that Smith will 
be understood as an extreme outlier, rather than an indicator of a deeper problem. There remains 
a broader need for concrete and systemic reform of the prison system as it treats Federally-
Sentenced Women (FSW) with mental health issues. In this analysis I will consider how civil 
litigation might be used in creative ways to seek remedies for this segment of the prison 
populations. Specifically, I will explore the viability of a class action lawsuit against CSC on 
behalf of FSW with mental health issues, with a sub-class of Aboriginal female prisoners. While 
there are admittedly a number of practical obstacles to bringing this type of lawsuit, a class action 
against the Crown offers an interesting combination of private and public law advantages as well 
as the potential for both individual recourse and systemic change. 
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L’enquête sur le décès sous garde d’Ashley Smith joue un rôle fondamental dans la considération 
du système carcéral, généralement impénétrable, et force le Service Correctionnel du Canada 
(SCC) à défendre ses politiques et pratiques dans l’œil intéressé du grand public. Toutefois, il 
existe un risque que le cas Smith soit interprété comme un cas extrême plutôt que comme un 
indicateur d’un programme plus grave. Il demeure important de mettre en œuvre des réformes 
tangibles et systémiques du système carcéral et de son traitement des femmes purgeant une peine 
de ressort fédéral (FPPF) et souffrant de maladies mentales. Dans cette analyse, nous 
envisagerons comment les contentieux civils peuvent constituer un recours alternatif d’obtenir 
réparation pour ce segment de la population. Plus précisément, nous aborderons la viabilité d’un 
recours collectif contre SCC au nom des FPPF souffrant de maladie mentale en créant une sous-
catégorie de prisonnières autochtones. Bien qu’il existe un nombre reconnu d’obstacles à 
l’introduction de telles actions, un recours collectif contre la couronne compte un agencement 
intéressant d’avantages découlant du droit public et d droit privé, ainsi que la possibilité de 
recours individuel et de changements systémiques. 
 




Ashley Smith’s tragic death while in federal custody has directed public attention to Canada’s 
treatment of prisoners with mental health issues. At the close of the recent Coroner’s inquest into 
her death, the jury described what happened to Smith as an example of how correctional and health 
care systems can “collectively fail to provide a mentally ill, high risk, high needs inmate with the 
appropriate care, treatment, and support” (Chief Coroner of Ontario, 2013). Importantly, the jury’s 













that Smith’s death was not simply the result of poor judgment by a few front-line staff, implicating 
decision-making processes at the highest level of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC).  
While there have been some positive developments in addressing mental health concerns 
for federally-sentenced women (FSW) in recent years, many of the conditions that contributed to 
Smith’s death still prevail in Canada’s prisons (Bingham and Sutton, 2012). As the jury’s 
recommendations from the Smith inquest are not legally binding, it remains unclear whether it will 
galvanize any meaningful systemic reform. Something more is needed. In this paper I will propose 
a novel route through the courts: a class action lawsuit against CSC. This type of action offers an 
interesting combination of private and public law advantages, as well as the potential for both 
individual recourse and systemic change.  
In the first section of this discussion, I will provide some background on FSW with mental 
health issues, and I will explain the rationale for a class action. I will then explore the legal 
foundation for class actions in Canada, and outline what a class action on behalf of FSW would 
potentially look like. While a class action against the Crown on behalf of FSW is no panacea, I will 
demonstrate that it should be seriously considered as a useful procedural vehicle for substantive 
reform.  
 
Background on FSW with mental health issues 
 
No single event in recent history has brought more attention to the issue of mental health in 
corrections than the in-custody death of Ashley Smith. In 2007, 19-year-old Ashley Smith died in 
a segregation cell at Grand Valley Institute for Women (OCI, 2008). She suffered from serious 
mental health issues, and was in segregation under suicide watch (OCI, 2008). Following orders 
from management, CSC staff refrained from intervening when Smith asphyxiated herself after tying 
a ligature around her own neck. CSC fired the warden and deputy warden after the incident, but the 
negligence charges that were laid against prison guards and supervisors were eventually dropped. 
Smith’s family initiated a lawsuit against CSC for negligence, which was reportedly settled out of 
court for eleven million dollars (Seglins, 2011). After a number of false starts, the inquest finally 
proceeded with eleven months of testimony involving more than 80 witnesses, and the jury returned 
a verdict of homicide (Chief Coroner of Ontario, 2013). The jury made a number of 
recommendations, such as ensuring that all female inmates are assessed by a psychologist within 
the first 72 hours of admission to prison. 
Now that the inquest is over, the pressing question is what can and will be done by CSC to 
improve the treatment of FSW with mental health issues. There are approximately 580 federally-
sentenced women (FSW) currently incarcerated in Canada, and Aboriginal women make up one 
third of the FSW population (OCI website). While much smaller than the male prisoner population, 
which numbers approximately 14,000, the FSW population is increasing at a faster rate: in the ten 
years leading up to March 2013, there was a 60 per cent increase in the FSW population (OCI 
website).1 Rather than translating into better care, the Arbour Report found that the relatively small 
number of female prisoners has been one of the reasons for the historic disadvantage they have 
suffered in the federal corrections system (Arbour Report).  
                                                        
1 In the ten years leading up to March 2013 there was a 60 per cent increase in the FSW population (OCI, 
2013) and between 2001-2012 there was a 109 per cent increase in the Aboriginal FSW population between 













Mental health care, as defined in section 85 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act 
(CCRA), is: “the care of a disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation or memory that 
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, the capacity to recognize reality or the ability to meet the 
ordinary demands of life.” Women in Canada’s prisons are more likely than men to have mental 
health issues (CHRC at 5.1.2) and they are much heavier users of CSC’s mental health care services 
(OCI, 2013). Approximately one third of FSW have a mental health diagnosis prior to their 
incarceration; further, 29 per cent of FSW are identified upon intake as having mental health 
problems (OCI, 2011). According to CSC data, 69 per cent of FSW received institutional mental 
health care services in 2010-2011, as compared with 45 per cent of male offenders (OCI, 2012). In 
2011-2012, 75 per cent of FSW received such services (OCI, 2013).   
Dealing with mental health issues in the custodial context is an incredibly complex task, 
and it should be recognized that CSC has made some important efforts to secure strategic and 
resource allocation at all levels of the system. For example, CSC has gathered stakeholder feedback 
and used it to develop a Mental Health Strategy for Women Offenders (“Strategy”) which was 
launched in 2002 (CSC website). The Strategy describes the mental health needs of FSW, and 
outlines the treatment programs demanded by CSC legislation and the policy directives required to 
appropriately deal  with the respective identified needs. CSC has invested approximately 90 million 
dollars since 2005 in order to implement the Strategy, and concerted efforts have been made to 
train front-line staff, strengthen delivery of mental health care within prisons, and to improve 
discharge planning for offenders with mental health issues (OCI, 2013). CSC has also been revising 
its approach to screening prisoners for mental health issues, and has developed a computerized 
mental health intake screening system (CoMHISS) for FSW (CSC website).  
The concern at this juncture, however, is whether CSC’s efforts are in fact translating into 
better conditions of confinement. The OCI and a number of advocacy organizations have identified 
a worrisome gap between policy and public pronouncements, on the one hand, and operational 
reality, on the other. With respect to the CSC’s employment of qualified mental health 
professionals, OCI has highlighted a number of staffing, recruitment, and retention challenges 
(OCI, 2013).2  Self-injury by inmates is another example here. The OCI recently assessed CSC’s 
mental health care initiatives in relation to the implementation of the Strategy, finding that these 
measures have resulted in “little substantive progress” since Smith’s death with respect to dealing 
with FSW who chronically self-injure (OCI, 2013b, p. 27). The OCI found that CSC responds to 
self-injurious behavior through a punitive or security approach—such as containment, isolation, 
and segregation—rather than addressing it as a mental health concern (OCI, 2013b, pp. 29-30). 
CSC’s use of a security or punitive approach as opposed to a mental health care approach was also 
highlighted in the report Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading: Canada’s Treatment of Federally-
Sentenced Women with Mental Health Issues (“IHRP Report”) (Bingham and Sutton, 2012). The 
IHRP Report established that Canada’s treatment of FSW violates international human rights law, 
emphasizing in particular: 
 
 A mental health strategy that is overly focused on assessment rather than treatment, and 
blind to FSW’s past histories of abuse; 
 Security classification tools that over-classify FSW with mental health issues and 
                                                        
2 Nearly one third of CSC’s total psychological staff is either vacant or “under-filled”. In the latter scenario, 
a position such as a psychologist position is filled by a non-licensed incumbent staff member who is unable 













Aboriginal women such that they are housed in more secure environments than required to 
manage their risk; and,  
 Excessive use of administrative segregation and institutional transfers to manage FSW with 
serious mental health issues, without judicial oversight (pp. 1-2). 
 
In light of the identified problems in the treatment of FSW with mental health issues, four categories 
of CSC practice may serve to ground a civil claim: (1) the security classification system, (2) the 
use of administrative segregation, (3) the use of institutional transfers, and (4) the failure to provide 
mental health care. The “Issues Chart” in Figure 1 provides further details on each of these areas. 
 
The rationale for a class action 
 
In the words of Canada’s Correctional Investigator, “Canadian correctional history is marked by a 
pattern of crisis and retrenchment followed by reform and progress” (OCI, 2013, p. 3). Following 
on the heels of the Smith inquest, a high-profile class action lawsuit could offer one novel route 
towards institutional reform. In this section of the paper I will review the legal framework for a 
class action in Canada, and discuss how this type of lawsuit might assist FSW with mental health 
issues moving forward. 
At the turn of the 21st century, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases greatly affected the law on 
class actions in Canada: Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 
(S.C.C.) [Dutton], Rumley v. British Columbia, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 (SCC) [Rumley], and Hollick 
v. Toronto (City), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) [Hollick]. Writing for a unanimous court in Dutton, 
Chief Justice McLachlin stated that the rise of class actions in modern litigation is undeniable and 
that without class actions, “the doors of justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, however strong 
their legal claims” (para. 26). Next, in Rumley, the Supreme Court allowed a claim by survivors of 
institutional abuse to proceed as a class action, demonstrating the potential for class actions to 
provide redress for vulnerable individuals impacted by systemic negligence. The legacy of Rumley 
was clear in the 2004 case of Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) [2004] O.J. No. 4924, 73 O.R. 
(3d) 401 (Ont. CA) [Cloud], where the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously certified a class action 
by residential school survivors who were seeking damages for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, 
assault, sexual assault, battery, and infringement of Aboriginal rights. The procedural advantages 
of class actions were emphasized in the third case in the trilogy, Hollick. In Hollick, the Supreme 
Court held that courts should take a broad and generous approach when interpreting the Ontario 
Class Proceedings Act. 
The use of class actions in the U.S. context offers an important example of prisoner rights 
advocacy in Canada. As Douglas Elliot (2011) explains, class actions in the U.S. have empowered 
vulnerable groups and enabled the judiciary to hold government to account for social injustices. 
Class action litigation has played a particularly important role in reforming U.S. correctional 
institutions, including with respect to correctional mental health systems reform (Metzner, 2002, p. 
19). Amy Laderberg explains how the class action lawsuit can help to enhance the credibility of 
vulnerable prisoners and give a sense of a systemic problem. Combining numerous complaints of 
sexual abuse, for example, permits characterization of the prison system as constituting a 
“sexualized environment” rather than a series of isolated individual incidents (Laderberg, 1998, pp. 
326-327). 
Elliot (2011) contends that several factors may impede class actions in the Canadian 













Canada’s use of administrative tribunals rather than the private bar for enforcing statutory rights, 
jurisdictional impediments that existed prior to the landmark ruling in Canada (Attorney General) 
v. Telezone, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, 2010 SCC 623, and the social barriers that Canada’s marginalized 
groups continue to experience (Elliot, 2011).  Yet he also notes that more recent cases such as 
Canada v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [Hislop]; Manuge v. Canada, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 67; and City of Vancouver v. Ward, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 [Ward], may indicate a 
shift towards a more hospitable climate. Class actions can complement political lobbying by 
advocates for marginalized populations by adding legal pressure (Elliot, 2011) and may also 
provide helpful cover to government actors to do the right, even if unpopular, thing.  
The liability of the Crown in tort is now well established in Canada, and the process of 
bringing an action against the Crown has come to resemble that of bringing one against a private 
defendant (Hogg and Monahan, 2011, pp .24-25).4 That being said, the Crown’s behavior as a 
defendant in the class actions context may differ from that of private defendants in a number of 
important ways (Sossin, 2011). First, the Crown has access to large amounts of funds and may not 
be threatened by large damage awards. Second, the Crown may be averse to settlements and more 
aggressive in resorting to procedural tactics to avoid liability. Third, the Crown may use retroactive 
legislation to avoid liability for civil damages . Fourth, the Crown may be more driven by political 
imperatives, which tend to engender more short-term solutions, than economic ones.  These 
observations are highly relevant to a possible class action against CSC. It might be expected that 
CSC will employ all of the procedural tactics at its disposal to prevent certification from happening, 
bringing motions and launching appeals whenever possible (Rudin, 2013).  
 
Model for a potential class action against the CSC 
 
In this section of the paper I will outline a class action brought as a plaintiff’s class proceeding 
(CPA at s.2(1)) in Ontario under the rules of this province. This could be run as a national opt-out 
class action out of Ontario. Through this type of action, residents of other provinces may be 
included in the class definition and potentially be bound by the court's judgment on common issues 
unless they opt-out in a prescribed manner and time.  
The recent Huronia psychiatric facility class action offers a helpful model here. The 
Huronia Regional Centre was a facility located in Orillia Ontario that opened in 1876 and provided 
a residential program for disabled individuals until it closed in 2009. It was the first institution of 
its kind in Ontario, and it housed as many as 2,500 people at a time. In the late 2000’s, with the 
assistance of litigation guardians, two former residents of Huronia brought a class action against 
the Ontario government to seek compensation for abuse and harm that the residents and their 
families suffered there. This class action was certified in July 2010, with legal claims relating to 
the government’s negligence and breach of duty in the running of the facility.  The class was defined 
as “all persons who resided at [Huronia] between January 1, 1945 and March 31, 2009 who were 
alive as of April 21, 2007” (the “Resident Class”) and “all parents, spouses, children and siblings 
                                                        
3 Prior to Telezone, the case of Grenier v. Canada, [2005] FCA 348, seemed to position public law as the 
primary vehicle for governmental accountability. The implication was that parties bringing an action against 
the Crown would first have to establish that the Crown’s conduct was problematic through judicial review. 
4 In Canada, the federal statute currently governing the liability of the Crown is the Crown Liability and 
Proceeding Act, RSC 1985, c.C.50 , and the relevant Ontario legislation is the Proceedings Against the Crown 













of persons who resided at Huronia between March 31, 1978 and March 31, 2009, who were alive 
as of April 21, 2007” (the “Family Class”). Because this was an opt-out class action, any individual 
who fell into either of these categories would be a class member unless they decided to remove 
themselves. The common issues that were certified—for determination at the common issues 
trial—related to whether the government breached a duty of care and/or a fiduciary duty owed to 
the Resident class to protect them from actionable physical or mental harm (Huronia Certification 
Order, 2010).  
Once the Huronia action was successfully certified, the next steps were to provide notice 
to the class members of certification, followed by the production of documents, examinations for 
discovery, and other procedural steps leading up to the determination of the substantive legal claims 
at the common issues trial. Rather than proceed to the common issues trial, however, Huronia was 
ultimately settled. I will return to the potential for a settlement below.  
 
The Motion for Certification 
 
The most significant procedural hurdle in any class action is the certification motion (Baert and 
Mason-Case, 2009). As stipulated in s.2(1) of Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act (CPA), a person 
who commences a plaintiff’s class proceeding “shall make a motion to a judge of the court for an 
order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding” and appointing a representative plaintiff. 
This stage of the process is not intended to test the merits of the action (Hollick, para. 16). It is 
focused rather on the form of the action and the question of whether it is appropriate for the suit to 
be brought as a class action (Hollick, para. 16). In this section of the paper I will outline how the 
five key certification requirements enumerated in s.5 of Ontario’s CPA could be addressed in a 
class action on behalf of FSW with mental health issues: cause of action, class definition, common 
issues, preferable procedure, and adequacy of representation. As affirmed by the OCA in Cloud, 
each one of these requirements must be addressed and satisfied in order for a motion for 
certification to succeed, although there may be issues of overlap and interdependency (Cloud, para. 
48).  
While there is no specific sub-provision in s.5 of the CPA relating to evidentiary 
requirements, some evidentiary basis must be shown for each of the s.5 requirements aside from 
the requirement that the pleadings disclose a cause of action (Watson, 2011, p.172). In Andersen v. 
St. Jude Medical Inc, [2003] O.J. No. 4314 [Anderson],5 Cullity J. noted that, while evidence is not 
admissible for determining whether a given claim would be successful at trial, evidence might play 
a role in convincing a court that an issue would appropriately proceed as a class action. The 
evidence required in a given case will depend on the complexity of the factual and legal issues 
involved (Watson, 2001, p. 175). Gathering evidence in the prison setting is likely to pose serious 
challenges. In the context of a class action for FSW, the recent inquiry into Ashley Smith’s death 
will likely be helpful as it has generated volumes of records relating to conditions of confinement 
for this segment of the prison population. Also, Lorne Sossin (2011) notes that the work of public 
bodies such as regulatory agencies, auditors general, and public inquiries sometimes provides a 
foundation and factual record upon which class action may proceed. To this end, all of the reports 
and commissions mentioned above, such as the Arbour Report and the various OCI reports might 
provide further evidence. 
 
                                                        













Cause of action 
 
Section 5(1)(a) of the CPA requires that the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause 
of action. At the certification stage the inquiry is a much more superficial or cursory one. From 
Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd. (1995) 21 O.R. (3d) 453 (Div Ct), the principles to be applied 
in determining whether there is a cause of action are as follows: all allegations of fact must be 
accepted as proved unless patently ridiculous or incapable of proof; the defendant, in order to 
succeed, must show that it is plain and obvious beyond doubt that the plaintiffs could not succeed; 
the novelty of the cause of action will not militate against the plaintiffs; and, the statement of claim 
must be read as generously as possible (at p.460). Watson highlights how this approach to s.5(1)(a) 
has made it particularly difficult for government defendants to argue that claims in negligence are 
based on policy rather than operational decision-making at the certification stage (Watson, 2011).  
In Hislop, the Certification Order outlined both Charter claims and claims in private law 
such as breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. In Cloud, the following causes of action 
were accepted by the OCA: claim for vicarious liability, claim for breach of fiduciary duty owed 
to members of the student class, claim for breach of fiduciary duty owed to family members and 
siblings, and claims for negligence. The G20 class action also combines tort and Charter claims, 
alleging systemic negligence, tort of unlawful imprisonment, and breach of a number of different 
Charter rights (G20 Class Action website).  
For a class action on behalf of FSW with mental health issues, the following causes of 
action may apply: negligence, tort of unlawful imprisonment, breach of fiduciary duty, and a claim 
specific to the treatment of Aboriginal prisoners under the rubric of R v. Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688.  
While the focus of this paper is on civil claims, there is no impediment to including a 
Charter claim as a cause of action in this class action suit. Indeed, it may be desirable to run a 




Section 5(1)(b) of the CPA requires that there be an identifiable class of two or more persons that 
would be represented by the plaintiff. The purpose of the class definition is to identify those persons 
who have a potential claim for relief, to define the parameters of the lawsuit so as to identify who 
is bound by the outcome, and to describe who is entitled to notice under the CPA (Bywater v. 
Toronto Transit Commission (1999) 43 OR (3d) 36, para. 10). The proposed class can include 
individuals who will not ultimately have a claim against the defendant (Bywater). This point is 
significantfor the proposed class action, as some members of the class might not be found to have 
actually been harmed by CSC through segregation, security classification, or institutional transfer, 
for example.  
As McLachlin C.J. stated in Dutton (para. 38), the proposed class must be capable of clear 
definition, with the members of the class being identifiable by stated, objective criteria that bear a 
“rational relationship” to the common issues. It is not necessary that every member of the class be 
named or known. McLachlin C.J. revisited these requirements in Hollick and confirmed that the 
class definition requirement is “not an onerous one” and that it cannot be defined in terms of the 
merits of the action (Hollick, para. 21). She stated that every class member does not need to share 
the same interest in the resolution of the common issue asserted, but the class will be found 
unnecessarily broad if it could be defined more narrowly “without arbitrarily excluding some 













In Cloud, the OCA determined that the proposed class of former residential school 
survivors, which was determined by attendance at the school during the specified time period of 
1922-1969, was appropriate (Cloud, para. 47). The court found the proposed class was 
“circumscribed by their defining criteria” and was not impermissibly open-ended (Cloud, para. 47). 
A rational connection to the common issues was also established because all class members claimed 
breach of the same duties and that they all suffered at least some harm as a result. As mentioned 
above, class definitions similarly based on residence in the institution during a fixed time period 
were also advanced in the Rideau and Huronia certification motions. 
The class definition for the proposed action is: all current and future FSW with mental 
health issues. While the class definition may at first glance sound quite broad, this is in fact a very 
discrete and identifiable group: as stated at the outset of this paper, the entire population of FSW is 
currently less than 600 individuals.  If we consider that approximately one third of female prisoners 
have identifiable mental health issues, we can expect the class of current FSW with mental health 
issues to number less than 200. While the female inmate population is growing at a faster rate than 
the male population, it can still be anticipated that the “future FSW with mental health issues” will 
be discrete and identifiable. Unique claims may also be advanced on behalf of Aboriginal women, 
both because of their unique experience of confinement, and because of special rights and 
entitlements afforded to Aboriginal prisoners in Canada’s legal system. In light of this, it may be 
appropriate to designate a separate subclass for the action as follows: All current and future 
Aboriginal FSW with mental health issues.  
As will be explained below in relation to the ‘representative plaintiff’ criteria under 
s.5(1)(e) of the CPA, while the class definition will not likely prove too problematic in the motion 





Section 5(1)(c) of the CPA requires that the claims of the class members raise common issues. A 
key function of this part of the certification test is to determine whether allowing the suit to proceed 
as a class action will help to avoid duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis (Dutton, paras. 39-
40). In Dutton, McLachlin C.J. stated that an issue will be common only where it is necessary to 
resolve it in order to resolve each class member’s claim. It is not necessary that the common issues 
predominate over non-common issues or that the resolution of common issues would be 
determinative of each class member’s claim (Dutton, paras. 39-40). McLachlin C.J. returned to this 
in Hollick and emphasized that for an issue to be common it must be a “substantial…ingredient” 
of each class member’s claims (para. 18). Most importantly, “success for one class member must 
mean success for all” (Dutton, paras. 39-40). Cloud confirmed that a liberal approach is to be taken 
to determining commonality. In Cloud, the OCA followed Hollick in finding that it was not fatal 
that apart from the common issues there were numerous issues that needed to be resolved 
individually (Cloud, para. 58). 
In the context of a negligence claim in Rumley, Chief Justice McLachlin found that the 
issues of breach of duty of care were common to the class of former residents at a residential school 
for blind and deaf students because all class members “share an interest in the question of whether 
the appellant breached a duty of care” (Rumley, para. 27).  In the Huronia proceeding, Cullity J. 
found that the claims advanced were similar to those in Cloud and Rumley in that they were 













based on the manner in which Huronia was maintained and administered by the Crown and no 
attempt is made to differentiate between the treatment and the claims of individuals who were 
resident there…”(Huronia Certification Order, para. 164). 
In Rumley the Supreme Court also held that the appropriateness and amount of punitive 
damages could be resolved as a common issue for all class members. On the note of damages, it is 
crucial to include aggregate damages as a common issue in the proposed class action. One key 
reason for this procedurally is that it will affect the ‘preferable procedure’ inquiry: the potential for 
aggregation of damages strengthens the case that a class action is the most efficient way to go about 
addressing the issue.  
Arguably, claims relating to vicarious liability should not be included as common issues. 
As Garry Watson (2011, p. 145) explains, allegations of vicarious liability will “invariably lead to 
a raft of individual issues and no common issues”; it is preferable to plead systemic negligence as 
was the case in Rumley. In the prison context, vicarious liability claims would make it necessary to 
determine for each individual in the class whether they were harmed by a prison officer. Unlike a 
negligence claim, assessment of common issues would not take care of the key inquiries. While 
McLachlin C.J. noted in Rumley that alleging systemic negligence might make the individual issues 
component of case more difficult, she agreed with the BC Court of Appeal’s finding that the 
respondents “are entitled to restrict the grounds of negligence they wish to advance to make the 
case more amenable to class proceedings if they choose to do so” (Referring to Rumley v. British 
Columbia (1999), 72 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), p.9).  
 
The following common issues for the proposed action may be advanced: 
 
For the main class (all current and future FSW with mental health issues): 
- By its operation or management of federal prisons, did the defendants owe a duty of care 
to class members? 
- What was the standard of care owed by the defendant to class members? 
- Did the defendants breach those duties? 
- Did the defendants owe a fiduciary duty to class members? 
- Did the defendants breach this duty? 
- If the court finds a breach of duty of care and/or a breach of fiduciary duty, can the court 
make an aggregate assessment of damages suffered by all class members as part of the 
common issues trial? 
- If the court finds a breach of duty of care and/or a breach of fiduciary duty, are other 
remedies available such as aggravated or punitive damages, or potentially a declaration or 
injunction? 
- Did the defendants commit the tort of unlawful imprisonment? 
 
For the subclass (all current and future Aboriginal FSW with mental health issues), in addition to 
the common issues outlined for the main class: 
 
- Do the defendants have responsibility to apply Gladue principles and uphold the Honour 
of the Crown in implementing the CCRA to members of the subclass? 
- Was this obligation violated in the defendant’s treatment of members of the subclass? 














When the claims are framed in this way, it can be argued that resolving the common issues will go 
some distance toward resolving all of the legal claims advanced on behalf of FSW with mental 
health issues. In the case of the negligence claims, for example, issues of causation and harm will 
have to be resolved on an individual basis, but determining whether there is a duty of care, to whom 
it is owed, what the standard is, and whether there has been a breach will resolve a large part of the 
claims. It can be expected in practice that CSC will vigorously argue that there are insufficient 
common issues to ground a class proceeding, so great care must be taken in framing the case in 




As required by s. 5(1)(d) of the CPA, a class proceeding must be the preferable procedure for the 
resolution of the identified common issues. This criterion is often the key point of contention in a 
motion for certification (Baxter v. Canada, [2006] O.J. No.4968, 83 O.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.J), para. 
24 [Baxter]). 
 The principles relating to the preferability inquiry are outlined in Hollick. The analysis 
should be conducted through the lens of the three key advantages of a class proceeding, that is: 
judicial economy, access to justice, and behavioral modification (para. 27). ‘Preferable’ means 
whether a class action offers a fair, efficient and manageable option for advancing the claim, and 
whether a class action is preferable to other procedures for resolving the class members’ claims. It 
is necessary to look at the common issues in context and to consider their relationship to the claims 
as a whole (Markson, para. 69).6Importantly, courts have been willing to consider aggregate 
assessment of damages as a way of addressing the preferability problems posed by individual 
damage claims (Watson, 2011, p. 151).  
In the certification proceeding for a class action relating to the Rideau Regional Centre in 
Smiths Falls, Ontario, the claimants drew attention to the fact that many class members were 
disabled, elderly, and physically as well as cognitively vulnerable (Statement of Claim, Rideau, 
para. 118). With respect to access to justice, they stated that certification would “ensure the class 
has meaningful redress in an arena where the inherent inequalities of bargaining power between 
these parties may be equalized in an efficient, case-managed environment” (Statement of Claim, 
Rideau, para. 119). The claimants pointed out that the legal costs of proceeding individually against 
an adversary such as the province of Ontario would be far in excess of the claims for damages made 
by individual members and thus make it impossible for them to bring the actions individually 
(Statement of Claim, Rideau, para. 118).  With respect to judicial economy, the claimants also 
argued that if individual trials were required the class members would each have to prove the legal 
relationship between themselves and the Crown and the scope of the duty owed (Statement of 
Claim, Rideau, para. 128). 
There are a number of obstacles impeding FSW with mental health issues from making 
individual claims, including: resource issues; logistical issues associated with an individual action 
from prison; fear of being viewed as antagonizing the prison system in which they still live; mental 
health issues. While such arguments are helpful on the ‘preferable procedure’ front, it should be 
noted that these same factors add to the difficulty in identifying a representative plaintiff.  
 
                                                        
6 There were questions following Hollick as to how the preferability analysis should be conducted but 













Adequacy of representation 
 
Section 5(1)(e) of the CPA requires the identification of a representative plaintiff who: (i) would 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; (ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding 
that sets out a workable method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying 
class members of the proceeding; and (iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an 
interest in conflict with the interests of other class members. 
Section 5(2) of the CPA stipulates that the subclass will require its own representative 
plaintiff if members of the subclass have claims that raise common issues not shared by all class 
members, so that “the protection of the interests of the subclass members requires that they be 
separately represented.” As explained above, many of the FSW most adversely affected by the lack 
of mental health services in prison are Aboriginal. A strategic decision will have to be made as to 
whether there should be separate representative plaintiffs for the class and subclass, with one being 
non-Aboriginal and the other Aboriginal. 
In Dutton, McLachlin C.J. stated that the proposed representative need not be typical of 
the class, nor the best possible representative, but “the court should be satisfied, however, that the 
proposed representative will vigorously and capably prosecute the interests of the class” (para. 41). 
To this end the court will also consider whether the representative plaintiff could bear any costs 
incurred to the representative in particular. 
As Doug Elliot points out, one of the most challenging aspects of class action litigation is 
identifying a suitable representative plaintiff “willing to expose themselves to significant risks, 
stress and loss of privacy in exchange for little or no reward” (Elliot, 2011, p.18). He specifically 
mentions the prison context, where the potential plaintiff may be in an ongoing relationship of 
vulnerability with the defendant and thus fearful of repercussions of getting involved with playing 
this prominent role in a claim (Elliot, 2011, p.19). This same problem may not exist for other class 
members, who can remain anonymous at least until an action is successful and it is time to collect 
their claim (Elliot, 2011, p.19). 
Ironically, the very characteristics of FSW with mental health issues that support the 
argument that a class action is a preferable procedure (i.e. their vulnerability) are the same 
characteristics that make the search for a representative plaintiff difficult. Given that one of the 
goals in bringing a class action is to induce systemic change at the institutional level, it is important 
for the court and the public to find the representative plaintiff sympathetic. This could be 
challenging in any type of prison litigation, especially where an FSW is in maximum security, 
classified as a dangerous offender, and/or has committed serious crimes. Such seemingly negative 
attributes could potentially engender a loss of sympathy for the representative and also make the 
litigation process difficult to manage, particularly where the plaintiff suffers from serious mental 
health issues. Yet, it is individuals in circumstances such as these who will be more likely to have 
experienced actual harm from segregation, lack of mental health care, security over-classification, 
and institutional transfers while in prison. To the extent that the court and the public find female 
offenders more palatable than male offenders, it may be helpful that the proposed class is all-
female.  
 
Possible Remedies for Class Members 
 
In the event that the motion for certification is successful, the class action suit would proceed to a 













the Crown might settle, and all class members who did not opt-out will be eligible to receive 
financial compensation. Sossin explains that a motion for certification could yield significant 
leverage towards a settlement, because it involves a low standard of proof (Sossin, 2011, p.6). The 
Supreme Court in Hollick also outlined how a successful certification motion could increase 
pressures on a defendant to settle, specifying: the various costs associated with defending a certified 
class action, the defendant’s enhanced exposure to damages, and the potential adverse publicity 
that arise in protracted class action litigation. The case of Corless v. KPMG LLP, [2008] O.J. 
No.3092, (cited in Watson, 2011, p. 164) offers an example of how class actions can work 
effectively through settlement where the defendant concedes early on in the process that there is a 
valid claim. The Huronia action, which resulted in a $35 million dollar settlement, offers another 
example here. The agreement included a formal apology by the Ontario Premier and a commitment 
by the provincial government to invest up to $5 million in programs to help people with 
developmental disabilities (Huronia Settlement Agreement). 
It remains possible that CSC could settle an action by FSW with mental health issues 
following a successful motion for certification, perhaps especially if there is significant media 
coverage and publicity around the claim. That being said, CSC would likely only do so if it 
reasonably believes the plaintiff class might be able to succeed on the merits, and specifically that 
individual issues of causation and harm will be established. The unfortunate reality is that if CSC 
has serious doubts about the plaintiffs’ prospects for success at trial, the pressure of the media and 
public scrutiny may not suffice to push it to settle. 
Baxter v. Canada is an example of a class action that resulted in a large settlement but still 
involved lengthy court battles and complex procedural battles. This multi-jurisdictional class action 
relating to Indian Residential Schools generated the largest class action settlement in Canadian 
history, of several billion dollars (Baxter, para. 7). Yet the Crown settled only after extensive efforts 
to litigate thousands of underlying claims of individual class members. Winkler J. found that 
compromise settlements such as this one provide an “inadequate forum for dealing with the 
underlying issues” (Baxter, para. 11). 
If the Crown does not settle and the action proceeds to trial, a successful class action may 
lead to a remedy of a declaration (declaring the rights of FSW with mental health issues) or an 
injunction (requiring CSC to do or refrain from doing something). Undoubtedly, the key offering 
of the class action approach, in terms of a potential remedy, is the aggregation of damages. Section 
24 of the CPA addresses the issue of aggregate assessment of monetary relief. The provision states 
that a court may determine the aggregate or a part of a defendant’s liability to class members and 
give judgment to that effect where: (a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of some or all class 
members; (b) no questions of fact or law other than those relating to the assessment of monetary 
relief remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the defendant’s monetary liability; 
and, (c) the aggregate or a part of the defendant’s liability to some or all class member can 
reasonably be determined  without proof by individual class members.  
In Cloud, the OCA considered s. 24 and held that claims for an aggregate assessment of 
damages and punitive damages are properly assessed as common issues (para. 70). The case of 
Markson also awarded aggregate damages under s.24, clarifying that it was not necessary to 
determine liability by the defendant to the whole class before this was done—it is about the 
defendant’s potential liability to the whole class.  
 The value of a damages award (or compensation through a settlement) in this context is 
two-fold. First, FSW with mental health issues as a group could receive some financial 













to individual female prisoners or FSW as a group would be a tangible indicator that the 
shortcomings of the prison system are very real. A judicial declaration stating that CSC has fallen 
short in mental health care, or the remedy of an injunction preventing CSC from resorting to certain 
practices—such as excessive transfers of FSW with mental health issues between institutions 




Undeniably, there is a greater likelihood of success for one federally-sentenced woman who suffers 
from mental health issues in bringing a single tort claim against CSC, in comparison with a class 
action on behalf of all FSW with mental health issues. At the same time, the class action format, 
with all its attendant risks and complexities, could offer a more substantial and lasting remedy for 
a larger number of FSW and generate a much higher profile case. While bringing a class action on 
behalf of this segment of the prison population is not without its complications, this procedural 
vehicle should be seriously considered as a way of enforcing the rights of female prisoners with 
mental health issues.  
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 with mental health issues 
Aboriginal FSW  
with mental health issues 
(1) CSC’s use 
of segregation 
for FSW with 
mental health 
issues;  
-For Canada to uphold its international 
and domestic human rights 
commitments there needs to be “an 
absolute prohibition on the practice of 
placing mentally ill offenders and those 
at risk of suicide or serious self-injury in 
prolonged segregation.”1 
- Disproportionate use of segregation on FSW as a way of 
dealing with mental health issues;  
- Disruption of treatment when in segregation;  
- Segregation for prolonged periods without judicial review; 
Segregation inappropriate for prisoners with mental health 
issues as it exacerbates symptoms.2 
-Disproportionate use of the Management 
Protocol3 or, following its disbandment, over-use 
and harsher terms of segregation for Aboriginal 









-Canada’s Correctional Investigator has 
stated: “…prisons are not hospitals, but 
some offenders are patients”.4  
-K.J., an Aboriginal FSW with serious 
mental health issues, sees a psychologist 
for 20 minutes per week.5  
-Ms. Worm was unable to access 
treatment for her post-traumatic stress 
disorder while in segregation.6 
- Lack of appropriate and available mental health care resources 
in prisons; Lack of integration of gender and mental health 
considerations across other areas of programming;7 
- Failure to recruit, hire, train, monitor, and supervise 
competent staff in areas of psychology and psychiatry; 
- Lack of continuity of mental health care while in segregation or 
upon institutional transfer; monitoring mental health of 
prisoners without treating it;8   
- Lack of financial and human resources devoted to 
implementing CSC’s mental health strategy.9 
- The restriction of maximum-security FSW from 
accessing the Aboriginal Healing lodge impedes 
Aboriginal FSW with mental health issues from 
accessing culturally-appropriate care; 
- Failure to take into account past histories of 
abuse; 
- Lack of Aboriginal-specific mental health care 
services within prisons that are culturally- 
appropriate. 
                                                        
1 Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2011-2012 (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 
2012) [OCI Annual Report 2012]. 
2 See Anderson v. Goord, 87 CV 141 (N.D.N.Y); Eng v. Goord, 80 CV 385S (W.D.N.Y.) which sought injunctions requiring mental health care for individuals in the 
SHU’s as well as alternative housing for prisoners for whom isolated confinement was “psychiatrically contraindicated”.2 Jeffrey L. Metzner also notes a general 
consensus among clinical psychiatrists that placement of inmates with serious mental illness in segregation units is contraindicated, “because many of these 
inmates’ psychiatric conditions will clinically deteriorate or not improve”. See Jeffrey L. Metzner, “Class Action Litigation in Correctional Psychiatry”, J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law, 2002; 30(1), pp.19-19 at p. 25 [Metzner]. 
3 Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, (2006). 10th Anniversary of the Arbour Commission Report, at p.4, [http://www.elizabethfry.ca/abr10e.pdf. at 
4]. 
4 OCI Annual Report 2012, supra note 1. 
5 See Elizabeth Bingham and Rebecca Sutton, “Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading? Canada’s Treatment of Federally-Sentenced Women with Mental Health 
Issues”, IHRP, June 2012, [http://media.thestar.topscms.com/acrobat/ba/55/3c47d5da4a599c0f879c56ebe3e6.pdf] [IHRP Report]. 
6 Ibid at p.58. 
7 Ibid at p.24. 
8 See American Civil Liberties Union, “ACLU of Indiana, Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Win U.S. District Court Decision Regarding Inhumane 
Treatment of Prisoners”, January 3, 2013, [http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/aclu-indiana-indiana-protection-and-advocacy-services-win-us-district-court]. 
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(3) CSC’s use 







- Canada’s Correctional Investigator: the 
number of mental health care 
interventions exceeded 69% of the total 
population of woman offenders.10 
- No security assessment tool specifically designed for women;  
- No security assessment tool specifically designed for prisoners 
with mental health issues;  
- Mental health needs of FSW interpreted as security risks, 
resulting in over-classification (especially for Aboriginal FSW);  
- Use of classification tools that have middle-class bias 
embedded in questions relating to employment, marriage, and 
addiction history.11 
- Security classification tools are culturally 
inappropriate because they take an overly-
individualized approach12 and translate 
Aboriginal women’s experiences of 
marginalization outside of prison into risk 
factors,13 resulting in over-classification of 
Aboriginal women;  
- The blanket policy of not allowing maximum 
security women to access the healing lodge 
instead of basing decisions on a case-by-case 
assessment;14  







-Ashley Smith was transferred 17 times 
in less than one year before her death in 
custody. 
-When prisoner K.J. was transferred to 
Grand Valley Institute she was taken off 
her psychiatric medication and placed 
on new medication. She noted her 
mental health treatment was routinely 
changed upon transfer between 
institutions.15 
- Disproportionate use of transfers as a way of dealing with 
mental health issues;  
- Disruption in mental health care treatment upon transfer; 
Inappropriate use of transfers as a way of avoiding oversight 
for over-use of segregation. 
- No statutory limit on the number of transfers to which one 
prisoner can be subject.16 
- No clear process by which FSW can access external review of 
repeated transfers or transfers away from home.17 
- Institutional transfer may cause re-
traumatization by replicating child welfare and 
guardianship transfers that inter-generational 
residential school survivors were subjected 
to.18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
9 “Needs Assessment of Federal Aboriginal Women Offenders”, CSC, at p.30, [http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r156/r156_e.pdf]. 
10 OCI Annual Report 2012, supra note 1 at Section IA. 
11 Department of Justice, Six Degrees from Liberation, Legal Needs of Women in Criminal and other matters, [http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-
rap/2003/rr03_la20-rr03_aj20/p11.html#foot160]. 
12 Patricia Monture-Angus, “Women and Risk: Aboriginal Women, Colonialism and Corrections Practice,” Canadian Woman Studies Journal, 1999, Vol. 19, pp. 
24-9 [Monture-Angus]. 
13 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Backgrounder 2: Recommendations of the Special Report”, [ http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/legislation_policies/fsw2-
eng.aspx].  As argued by CAEFS, CSC’s assessment instruments are culturally inappropriate and translate Aboriginal women’s marginalized experiences outside 
of prison into risk factors. See Submission of CAEFs to the Canadian Human Rights Commission for the Special Report on Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 
Race and Disability Faced by Federally Sentenced Women (May 2003),  
[http://www.elizabethfry.ca/chrc/CAEFS_SUBMISSION_TO_CHRC_INQUIRY_accountability.pdf]   
14 Ibid. 
15 IHRP Report, supra note 5 at p.16. 
16 Ibid at p.38. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at p. 36. 
